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THE CONFIRMATION MESS
Stephen Carter*
Constitutional theory is widely regarded by scholars as one of the
great disasters in contemporary legal thought. None of the popular
theories is seen as finally workable, all are contingent and internally
chaotic, and the courts that must do the serious work of interpreting
the Constitution show no serious interest in any of them. The ever-
messier business of nominating and confirming Justices to serve on
the Supreme Court is, in its way, contributing to the chaos, and things
were spiraling downward well before the Senate's decisive rejection
of the nomination of Robert Bork. The Senate, unable to agree on
the precise role that it should play in the selection process, now finds
itself trapped between the notion that it should act to enforce a set of
professional standards, reviewing nominees only to ensure that they
possess proper qualifications, and the idea that it should inquire deeply
into the substantive judicial philosophy of each nominee, to keep from
the Court those whose constitutional visions are too extreme for the
American people to stomach. Neither of these roles is a useful one
for the Senate to play - the one because it trivializes the process, the
other because it trivializes the Constitution. There is higher ground,
however, and this is a small story about how the Senate might get
there.
I. THE PAPER RECORD
It has become something of a commonplace in the wake of the
Bork debacle to assert that Robert Bork was, on paper, perhaps the
best qualified candidate in many decades to be nominated to serve on
the Supreme Court. ' The implication is that there exists a set of ideal
objective criteria by which nominees should be judged. The criteria
most bandied about (and not merely in the Bork battle) involve profes-
sional accomplishment: cases briefed and argued, law review articles
authored, judicial or other public service, and so on. The list is
perhaps not very different from what a top law firm or leading law
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school would look for in its next hire. The effect is to objectify a
process that the Constitution seems to treat as political. In this ideal-
ized vision, appointment to the Court becomes not the outcome of a
political struggle between President and Senate, but almost a reward
for the lawyer who has compiled the most resume points when the
time comes to stop and add up the scores.
Intellectual capacity is hardly irrelevant to qualification for service
on the Supreme Court. The vision of appointment as a reward,
however, does more than establish a baseline; it treats a Justiceship
like a merit promotion, and it implies that "professional qualifications"
are more important than anything else. The American Bar Associa-
tion, like the Senate that routinely asks its advice, reinforces this
vision through its system for rating nominees. The Association's
Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary ranks nominees as "Well
Qualified," "Not Opposed," and "Not Qualified." 2 The rating of "Well
Qualified" is reserved for nominees "who meet the highest standards
of professional competence, judicial temperament and integrity" -
those who are "among the best available for appointment to the
Supreme Court."3 Those who are rated as "Not Opposed" are consid-
ered only "minimally qualified"; those rated as "Not Qualified" lack
the "professional qualifications for appointment to the Supreme
Court. "'4
It is plainly quite useful to a senator to be able to explain a vote
against a nominee for the Supreme Court - or, for that matter,
against a nominee for any federal court - on the ground that, what-
ever one may think of the individual's politics or policies, the nominee
was not qualified. When the plum of appointment is not justified by
the candidate's resume, then a member of the Senate must reluctantly
break with the President and vote "No."
All of this sounds very impressive, and it possesses a clear, rational
appeal that doubtless plays well on the stump. Indeed, it is perfectly
sensible for the Senate to review a candidate's professional experience
to determine whether she meets some baseline standard of legal and
intellectual competence.5 Serious difficulties arise, however, from
2 This is different from the system that the Association uses to rank nominees for the other
federal courts. Those nominees are rated as "Exceptionally Well Qualified," "Well Qualified,"
"Qualified," and "Not Qualified." See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING COMMITTEE
ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 4-5 (1983).
3 Id. at 8.
4 Id.
5 Setting the baseline, however, may be difficult. The Senate's 197o rejection of President
Nixon's nomination of G. Harrold Carswell was based more or less explicitly on the conclusion
that Judge Carswell was not competent to do the job, but sparked controversy nevertheless.
Some commentators found the Senate's threshold approach problematic, see, e.g., Halper, Senate
Rejection of Supreme Court Nominees, 22 DRAKE L. REV. 102, 103-07 (1972), whereas others
thought it was for the best, see, e.g., McConnell, Haynsworth and Carswell: A New Senate
Standard of Excellence, 59 Ky. L.J. 7, 21-24 (1970).
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treating the candidate's paper qualifications as sufficient in and of
themselves to justify appointment. The obvious problem is that the
model of the confirmation process as essentially a resume review is
profoundly ahistorical. Those who designed the process plainly con-
templated the Senate's role as a significant check on presidential dis-
cretion. 6 The less obvious problem is that even if the resume review
model is appealing, the traditional credentials - prior judicial expe-
rience stands out as an exception - seem to bear little relation to the
work of a judge. Why are excellence in legal scholarship or significant
experience in litigation important parts of the ideal resume?
It is not really clear, for example, what the Senate should search
for when it looks to see whether a nominee has a respected record as
a legal scholar. A scholar may produce outstanding scholarship and
show evidence of a fine mind. Yet the nominee who refuses to aban-
don positions taken as a scholar is arguably too closed-minded to serve
as a judge; the scholar who abandons those positions at will is left
open to the charge of sacrificing principle for expediency.
Especially in the field of constitutional theory, moreover, many
legal scholars are accustomed to dealing with problems at a relatively
high level of generality, often adducing principles from arcane philos-
ophies and even from the air, rather than from the needs of particular
cases. Possibly such individuals are ideal Justices - perhaps they
will do equal justice to all persons because they are not accustomed
to thinking about parties as persons. But they may also be disastrous
as Justices, precisely because their habits of mind may not press them
to think hard enough about the practical problems that arise from the
application of abstract principles to concrete cases.
Another claim, and one that partly answers the concern over a
lack of familiarity with the problems of deciding real cases, is that
the ideal nominee should have litigated real cases before real judges.
But experience in twisting law to fit facts and facts to fit preferred
results is an obvious qualification only for judging of a particular kind
- the kind in which the answer is more important than the route
one takes to find it. A skill at crafting an argument for a result is
not the same as a skill at finding the result the law requires. If the
second skill is more desirable in judges than the first, it may be more
important to find lawyers who have done good work advising clients
on the legality of planned conduct than lawyers who have built their
6 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 457 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (suggesting
that the Senate's role in confirmation "would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism
in the President" and make it less likely that "disposition of offices would be governed by ...
his private inclinations and interests"). The implications of the historical understanding have
been picked over elsewhere, and in detail. See, e.g., J. HARRIs, ADVICE AND CONSENT OF
THE SENATE 17-35 (1953); L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT ('985); Black, A
Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657 (1970).
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reputations by solving their clients' problems in the courts. Although
lawyers who brief and argue cases for a living also have experience
rummaging through the record in search of holes and help, judges
have law clerks to do that work for them, and therein lies an intrigu-
ing possibility: if one wants seriously to treat fitness for judging as a
matter determined primarily by professional qualification, then per-
haps judging should be treated as an independent profession, rather
than as an extension of lawyering, and judgeships awarded to those
who have invested time and effort in preparing themselves for the
role. 7 The beginner might then learn how to judge in the tradition
of apprenticeship, by sitting at the feet of the master, watching and,
eventually, imitating when called upon to do some part of the work.
The proper professional qualification for judging generally might then
be apprentice judging - service as a law clerk. 8 (The usual one- or
two-year term of service might of course need to be extended.) The
most important professional qualification for the highest form of judg-
ing - the judging that the Supreme Court does - would be service
as a judge on a lower court.
The rhetoric of confirmation debates often does treat service on a
lower court as an important professional qualification. If judging is
truly to be viewed as a profession, however, and if Justices of the
Supreme Court are truly to be viewed as judges, then service on lower
courts and the quality of that service (measured by the standards of
the profession) should be the paramount qualifications. An occasional
exception to the requirement of judicial experience might be made for
the brilliant apprentice able to skip the years as journeyman and jump
directly to master, except that even the most ardent advocates of the
professionalization of the judiciary seem unprepared to appoint Jus-
tices directly from the ranks of even the best law clerks. This suggests
that our devotion to appointing as Justices the individuals with the
best professional qualifications does not readily lead us to treat judging
as an independent profession. Perhaps the claim that professional
accomplishment matters is itself a bit overstated. In that case, a
Senate seeking a useful role in the confirmation process must find
another standard to apply.
7 For an intriguing - but incomplete - argument for reforming the American judiciary by
adopting aspects of the continental career-judiciary model, see Langbein, The German Advantage
in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 848-55 (1985).
8 Consider the tasks that most law clerks perform. The clerks read briefs to get a sense of
the issues raised. So must judges. The clerks meticulously work towards an impressive com-
mand of the facts and law involved. So should judges. The clerks are capable of dispassionate
analysis of both parties' legal arguments. So ought judges to be. The clerks often draft opinions.
So, one hopes, do judges. (In fact, it might be useful for the Senate to ask nominees who have
been judges how they have used their clerks.) Law clerks, moreover, spend their terms in close
company with living, breathing, working judges - in the case of the most successful law clerks,
with Supreme Court Justices.
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11. THE PAPER TRAIL
For most Americans, the Supreme Court of the United States is
shrouded in a distant and somewhat frustrating aura of legal majesty.
The Justices hand down decisions that touch the lives of every Amer-
ican, and yet they are seen as untouchable, unreachable, and unper-
suadable by public protest. Despite the bitter criticisms that it fre-
quently faces, the Court retains an almost mythic character: the
Justices meet, lawyers argue, and every now and then, unexpectedly,
the Justices decide - and new, fundamental, unchallengeable law is
made.
When the public hates what the Court decides, there is grumbling
about amending the Constitution or appointing some new people who
will turn things around. The grumbling, however, is an inevitable
concomitant of an underlying tension vital to the constitutional
scheme: the Constitution clothes the Justices in the raiment of inde-
pendence, and if they seem so frustratingly distant that individual
citizens and even organized pressure groups cannot hope to have much
influence over what the Court decrees as fundamental constitutional
law, that is simply evidence that the scheme is working well.
The moment when one of the distant and mystical guardians steps
aside is a crucial political instant, a time when the Justices seem
suddenly mortal, when one who wishes to join them comes before the
bar of politics as a supplicant, when the elected representatives of the
People of the United States can pass judgment. Suddenly there is an
opportunity to influence the course of judicial decision, to show ap-
probation or disapproval of the work of the Court. The rhetoric of
the moment is irresistible: let us test this candidate, to ensure that he
or she shares our values, is not out of step with the moral judgments
of the American people, and will read the Constitution not according
to some eccentric or extremist philosophy, but rather in the way that
We the People demand.
The notion that the confirmation process should include a sub-
stantive review of the nominee's legal theories long antedates the
controversies that have beset the confirmation process over the past
two decades. 9 The idea has immediate appeal, for it is in the name
of We the People that the entire apparatus of the federal government
purports to exercise authority. Although the most forceful defenders
9 Inquiry into the nominee's substantive legal positions became the order of the day in the
wake of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 6o U.S. (i9 How.) 393 (1857), when all nominees were for a
time called upon to prove their antislavery convictions. See 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 320-57 (rev. ed. 1926). For subsequent developments, see,
for example, Friedman, The Transformation in Senate Response to Supreme Court Nominations:
From Reconstruction to the Taft Administration and Beyond, 5 CARDozo L. REv. 1, 5-37
(1983).
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of judicial independence occasionally forget the fact, every federal
judge is an agent of that apparatus. Different apparatchiks have
different roles and might be insulated from pressures in a variety of
ways, but judicial independence from the passions of the moment is
not obviously equivalent to independence from the passionate sweep
of history. The nation moves, and Justices very far ahead of it are
as likely to be swept into irrelevance as those very far behind. Be-
cause the politically sensitive President nominates the Justices and the
politically sensitive Senate must consent to the nominations, it is no
easy matter to argue that the selection process was designed to be, or
can practically be made to be, entirely distinct from politics.
There is a sense in which the ultimate amenability of the Court
to politics is something to be celebrated, for the nomination process
is often the only effective device by which the people can signal their
approval of the work of the Court or try to force a shift in course.
"Here the people rule," President Ford announced after the resignation
of his predecessor,' 0 and no doubt opponents of a defeated Supreme
Court nomination are tempted to make the same proclamation. After
all, if maintenance of the constitutional system requires a polity that
believes that it governs itself, it is useful that the system should
provide an occasional reminder of who ultimately is in charge. It
ought to come as no surprise, consequently, that politicians so readily
embrace the current academic fashion that invites the Senate to assess
something called "judicial philosophy" in deciding whether to consent
to a nomination.
But "judicial philosophy," especially as the term is used by pro-
ponents of quizzing judicial nominees about their own, is not easy to
distinguish from the prediction of results in concrete cases. So slippery
and elusive is the concept of judicial philosophy that trying to define
it at all is, as Harold Schonberg wrote of playing chess against former
world champion Tigran Petrosian, "like trying to put handcuffs on an
eel."" Trying to define it in a way that accurately captures what the
advocates of substantive scrutiny mean by it, but that does not
threaten judicial independence, is harder still.
Most Americans, after all, know the Court principally by the
results that it reaches. In public debate, aside from a handful of such
political buzzwords as "intent of the Framers" and "judicial activism,"
judicial philosophy in the sense that is of interest to constitutional
theorists does not exist. For most of the people, most of the time,
Constitution and Court alike are dimly seen, indistinguishable abstrac-
tions. The Constitution is the thing that the Justices call upon when
they let criminals run loose on the street or put segregationists in their
10 N.Y. Times, Aug. io, 1974, at 1, col. 7.
11 H. SCHONBERG, GRANDMASTERS OF CHESS 245 (rev. ed. 198x).
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place, shoulder God out of the classroom or preserve the privacy of
the bedroom. Although Americans do exhibit a chauvinistic pride in
a Constitution that very few have read, when considering the consti-
tutional rules under which we live, it is the Court, not the Constitu-
tion, that America blames or extols.'12
It can scarcely be surprising, then, that Americans display an
almost proprietary interest in the makeup of the Supreme Court and
in those constitutional rights that the Court has decreed them to
possess. The issue, however, is hardly one of constitutional interpre-
tation. Never mind that theorists might question, for example,
whether the right to reproductive privacy has a constitutional basis;
those who think the right a good thing are satisfied that it has a
judicial basis, that is, that the Supreme Court includes at least five
Justices who want to protect it. When the people and their represen-
tatives talk of "protecting our basic rights," or even "maintaining the
essential balance," it is hard to imagine that they mean much more
than "making sure we still have the votes." The constitutional rights
defined by the Court's decisions take on an independent virtue, quite
distinct from any theory of constitutional interpretation, and it is those
rights, not a theory, that the political rhetoric about judicial philoso-
phy is meant to protect.
This is surely the message behind the purported discovery of a
series of smoking guns in the intellectual baggage that Judge Bork
brought to his confirmation hearings. Critics insisted that Judge
Bork's constitutional theory was outside the mainstream of contem-
porary jurisprudence, but unless the mainstream is defined very nar-
rowly, this charge is surely incorrect as a factual matter. One of the
gravest weaknesses of the liberal constitutional theory that currently
dominates the academy is its inability to point to much in the Con-
stitution's text or history to explain the supposed wrongheadedness of
the conservative assault on the work of the modern Court. Judge
Bork was pilloried, for example, for his dogged reliance on the original
understanding as a tool for interpretation. 13 Whatever the degree of
controversy among legal scholars on originalism as a method, how-
ever, it is just that - a controversy. Originalism plainly has its
supporters, including Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
12 For a wonderful account of the nation's stormy love affair with Constitution and Court,
see M. KAmMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF (1986).
13 Other critics blasted Judge Bork as result oriented - enforcing a rigidly originalist per-
spective when it suited his purposes, and relaxing the requirements of originalism when the
theory led to the wrong results. In the current state of constitutional theory, however, this is
not much of a criticism. It can easily be made of virtually all the important work of the current
Court, and similar inconsistencies haunt virtually every effort to work out a coherent approach
to constitutional interpretation. In public debate, of course, the charge that a judge is result-
oriented has greater or lesser force depending on the popularity of the results in question.
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States, who do not blink at originalism as a strategy when it serves
their interests.
14
The more sophisticated version of the assault suggested that Judge
Bork's theory as applied would lead to results out of step with what
the American people would prefer. But this claim, too, is an argument
over concrete cases, for the American people, whatever their reverence
for the Constitution itself, however strong their affection for particular
rights, cannot fairly be said to share a constitutional theory. The
tendency in contemporary political rhetoric to say "philosophy" but
mean "rights we like" was showcased during the Bork battle in the
bizarre spectacle of elected representatives of the people of the United
States solemnly propounding such questions as whether a Bork ap-
pointment would further or hinder the articulated interests (and, im-
plicitly, the political programs) of women, or of nonwhites, or of a
Congress jealous of its foreign policy prerogatives, until in the rush
to explain what valued decisions a hypothetical Justice Bork would
overturn, the Bork confirmation battle took on the aspect of an elec-
tion contest in which one party accused the other of seeking to un-
dermine the nation's traditional values.
That charges of this kind were made, and with real venom, hardly
makes the Bork battle unique. In fact, the battle was unusual only
because the charges were taken seriously and the nominee was re-
jected. Members of the Senate are practical politicians, not noted for
voting to reject Supreme Court nominees if the vote will cause trouble
back home. This in turn suggests that the fundamental charge against
Judge Bork - that the results that a Justice Bork might reach would
not match the results that the American people would prefer - was
true. Certainly his views as understood by the American people
14 Every Justice who has sat on the Court in recent years has written or joined opinions
invoking the original understanding to decide questions involving the separation of powers.
See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, io6 S. Ct. 3181, 3186-87 (1986) (Burger, C.J., joined by Brennan,
Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ.) (appealing to original understanding on legislative action);
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-51 (1983) (Burger, C.J., joined by Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor, JJ.) (same); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 771-78
(1982) (White, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (appealing to
original understanding on punishment of the President). Elsewhere I have referred to this
tendency to rely on originalism in separation-of-powers disputes as the "de-evolutionary tradi-
tion." Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-Evolution of the
Separation of Powers, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming). The same willingness to invoke the
original understanding is apparent in cases involving individual rights, where even those Justices
most noted for their vision of an evolving Constitution are capable of considerable originalist
rigor. See, e.g., City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 154-55 n.18 (x981) (Marshall, J.,
joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (invoking original understanding of thirteenth
amendment); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 396-98 (978) (Marshall,
J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (invoking original understanding of
fourteenth amendment).
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seemed out of step with their own. Yet even assuming an identity
between the views he was perceived to have and the views he had in
fact, what is the message in his rejection on this ground? The message
must surely be that when the people and their senators and their
President talk about "judicial philosophy," they have in mind not
adherence to a particular theory, but "people who will reach the results
we like," and that both the President and the Senate (and through
them, perhaps, the people) see the appointment process as an oppor-
tunity to pack the Court with Justices who will vote the right way.
If this is so, then anyone who cares about the integrity of consti-
tutional theory and the independence of the courts should be troubled.
At bottom, all the ringing phrases about permitting the ascension only
of Justices whose constitutional views are congruent with those of the
people - even assuming that the senators know what the people are
thinking - contradict first principles of judicial review. Beginning
constitutional law students are taught that the Supreme Court serves
as a countermajoritarian brake. The institution of judicial review
exists precisely to thwart, not to further, the self-interested programs
of temporary majorities.
Thus a worrisome paradox emerges. On the one hand, the courts
exist at least in part to limit majority sway. On the other, the courts
are to be peopled with judges selected at least in part because their
constitutional judgments are consistent with those of the majority.
Even for a critic who disdains theory and revels in concrete results,
this process of judicial selection can be attractive only if one knows
(and agrees with) the predilections of a majority of the senators - or
of the people in whose name they render judgments on what the
Constitution ought to be read to say. For the scholar who believes in
the possibility of constitutional theory, the collapse of the nomination
and confirmation process into a battle over concrete results carries the
potential for disaster.
Constitutional theory is concerned principally with the Constitution
as a document and the Supreme Court as an institution. For a
constitutional theorist who cares about more than results, a decision
is only as legitimate as the judicial process that it reflects. Constitu-
tional theorists therefore take seriously the analysis that the majority
in a given case presents in defense of its work. To the theorist, what
matters is the legitimacy of the reasoning offered by the Justices to
connect the Constitution to the end result. If there is no connection
- if the decision seems to represent no more than a personal predi-
lection or perhaps a guess - then a serious theorist must conclude
that the Court is not doing its job. If the Justices are appointed
because their personal predilections suggest an affection for particular
results that the senators also like, the theorist must conclude that the
Senate is trying to prevent the Court from doing its job.
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To wrap the armor of countermajoritarian independence around
individuals selected on the basis of predictions about how they will
vote represents the enshrinement, through life tenure, of the popular
political judgments of particular eras about the proper scope of con-
stitutional protections - a peculiar fealty to pay to the notion of a
written Constitution. Interpretation of a written Constitution should
reflect a dispassionate search for fundamental constitutional principles
that transcend even the most deeply felt popular passions of a given
political moment.' 5 Extending life tenure to the judiciary protects the
possibility of that dispassionate search. A confirmation process aimed
consciously at preserving or overturning particular precedents might
be justifiable were the Justices to serve, for example, eight- or ten- or
twelve-year terms. But if Justices are selected not because they are
wise but because they are right, it is not easy to see why they should
serve for life. Constitutional amendments - the locking-in of new
binding rules - supposedly require something more than the concur-
rence of the President and a bare majority of the Senate. To concede
the propriety of denying appointment to the Supreme Court on the
basis of a prediction of concrete results is to encourage efforts to
determine constitutional meaning through a different mechanism, one
too easily manipulated by temporary political majorities.
Judicial independence, if the concept is to have any force, is not
a cloak that can be thrown around a new Justice at the very last
minute - after the administration of the oath. Independence must
arrive earlier, and cover all potential nominees, from the moment that
a sitting Justice retires or dies. A nominee is not independent when
she is quizzed, openly or not, on the degree of her reverence for
particular precedents. If the President who must select a nominee or
the Senate that must confirm one can in effect elicit campaign promises
while the vacancy exists, then they surely would be justified in com-
plaining bitterly should those promises later be broken.
And yet it is easy to understand how a Senate casting about for
its proper role in the process might have stumbled down the path
toward electing rather than confirming Supreme Court nominees. It
is all very well for constitutional theorists, who spend their profes-
sional lives divining and criticizing judicial philosophies, to call upon
the Senate to do the same thing. As a matter of practical politics,
however, it is remarkable that anyone would think the Senate able to
do it.
Is To cherish dispassion (in the sense of relative objectivity) as a goal is not necessarily the
same as proclaiming it as a real possibility. Rather, the effort to recognize and overcome one's
own biases may itself be an important disciplining tool. See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,
34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REv.
445 (x984); Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary
Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821 (1985).
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Passing entirely the question of what judicial philosophy is, it
should be perfectly plain that at any level much more sophisticated
than "Will this nominee vote my party's line?" the members of the
Senate are not competent to evaluate it. The carefully nuanced schol-
arly debate over judicial philosophy is certainly beyond the interest,
and probably beyond the ken, of most members of the Senate. Their
staff members, while bright, ambitious, enthusiastic, and, in many
cases, well trained in the law, are unlikely to possess what Alexander
Bickel hopefully referred to as "the leisure, the training, and the
insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of-
government. "16 Senators and their staff members will not have read
deeply or broadly in the literature on judicial philosophy or adjudi-
cation or interpretation; even if they have, they will be unlikely to
have the scholarly, turn of mind vital to making sense of it all. This
is no knock on the senators; it is, if anything, a knock on the notion
that something as obscure and subtle as "judicial philosophy" is a
sensible measuring stick for use in the essentially political process of
selecting judges. 17
The Senate is designed to be a deliberative body, but not neces-
sarily a deeply intellectual one. This institutional characteristic can
be counted a weakness only if one doubts the proposition of relative
institutional advantage - that some organizational forms are better
than others at performing particular tasks. The Senate may lack the
institutional capacity to evaluate judicial philosophy in any non trivial
theoretical sense, but that should not limit the senators to assessing
the so-called "professional qualifications of the nominee." It simply
means that the Senate ought to look elsewhere in seeking to discover
what special expertise it might bring to bear on the confirmation
process.
16 A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 25-26 (1962). Judge Bork is among those
who doubt that even judges, about whom Professor Bickel was speaking, possess the virtues
mentioned. See Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383, 389 (1985). Ronald
Dworkin, in turn, has questioned whether Judge Bork himself possesses a judicial philosophy.
See Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, 9 CARDozo L. REV. 101, 104-12 (1987). The hunt for a
nominee's judicial philosophy may be even more illusory than the text suggests if, as is con-
ceivable, practical judges are unlikely to have one. Cf. N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1987, at Bg, col.
5 (quoting a conservative activist who complained of Judge Anthony Kennedy: "He doesn't have
a judicial philosophy we can get our hands on.").
17 Possibly the Senate staff members, and even the senators themselves, can gain some
rough-and-ready insights by attending seminars produced for their benefit by constitutional
scholars, but to suppose that such seminars would suddenly confer an adequately sophisticated
appreciation of the nuances of constitutional theory is to assume, on little evidence, a learning
curve that is remarkably steep. And if, as may happen, the scholars conducting the seminars
are also involved in an effort to sway sentiment against the nominee, then the quickly educated
staff runs the risk of being trained to follow in the footsteps of Fred Cramer, an aide to Bobby
Fischer during the latter's 1972 match with Boris Spassky for the World Chess Championship.
Said Cramer: "My job is to complain, not to approve." S. GLIGORIC, FISCHER V. SPASSKY:
WORLD CHESS CHAMPIONSHIP MATCH 1972, at 8I (1972).
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III. THE SOUL OF DEMOCRACY
The Senate is less directly responsive to political pressures than is
the House of Representatives because members of the Senate stand
for election every six years rather than every two. In any given year,
the entire House is never more than two years away from facing the
voters, but two-thirds of the Senate is always a minimum of two years
from the next election - usually more. In theory, then, the House,
designed to respond to the popular will, is and should be swayed by
passions when the American people are swayed by passions, generous
when the people are in the mood to share what they have, parsimon-
ious when the people are in the mood to keep what is theirs. The
Senate is more capable than the House of reflective and deliberative
consideration of the issues confronting the legislative branch. The
House of Representatives might be considered the heart of the de-
mocracy. The Senate, then, must surely be the soul.18
The Senate, responsive to public will but also sharing some of the
distance of the courts, has the ability to give voice not simply to the
passions of the moment, but to the enduring and fundamental values
that shape the specialness of the American people. The institutional
design of bicameralism makes this balance possible: what the House
votes in its haste, the Senate may reconsider at its leisure. The Senate
has no special institutional perspective and no relevant special char-
acteristic but this one. If the senators cannot successfully bring to
bear on the confirmation process the characteristics that make their
institution unique, then there is scarcely an argument available for
resting the confirmation power in the Senate rather than in the House,
or in the Congress as a whole.
Giving voice to the deepest common values of the American order
does not mean masquerading as either a professional standards review
board or a law school appointments committee. It means doing what
responsible members of the Senate do best: representing their constit-
uents by reaching conclusions based on a relatively disinterested dia-
logue, which may be a principally internal one, about the policy most
congruent with the fundamental aspirations and long-term interests of
the American people.
This dialogue has little to do with predicting results in specific
cases. A reflective Senate would refuse to speculate about a potential
nominee's likely votes, and would eschew any inquiry into judicial
philosophy, not merely because the body might be institutionally in-
capable of evaluating a nominee's philosophy, but also because the
long-term interest of the American people requires what, at a deep
18 To stretch the metaphor even further, the executive branch might be said to be the brain,
and the judiciary the conscience. The life's blood is, of course, the free and open exchange of
ideas.
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level, most Americans probably want or believe that they have: an
independent judiciary. This shared understanding on the desirability
of a particular institutional design - courts that are beyond direct
political manipulation - does not, of course, rise to the level of a
sophisticated theory of law or politics. Deeply shared values of this
kind, however, form a more reliable basis for judgments likely to
affect the course of the nation for years to come than do vague and
more elusive theories about constitutional interpretation. A reflective
Senate would understand the threat to judicial independence that is
posed when the appointment process is used, by Senate and President
alike, as a means for pursuing the short-term partisan end of validat-
ing or overturning particular lines of cases. 19
The ideal judge in the federal system deliberates largely in the
absence of distinct political pressures, and the ideal Supreme Court
Justice must be most independent of all. Although there plainly is
substance in Alexander Bickel's metaphor of the judicial process as
"endlessly renewed educational conversation, '20 the picture of a Su-
preme Court that acts mindful of the popular disobedience of unpo-
pular edicts lurking just beyond a horizon guarded by the passive
virtues seems less apt in the contemporary climate than it might have
been in an earlier age. Circumvention of unpopular opinions has
become a sophisticated science, but a secret one. Public proclamation
of defiance is over. Thus there is no longer what Bickel envisioned:
a judicial struggle to preserve legitimacy in the sense of effective
authority. And yet the dialogic metaphor still has much to recommend
it, and a sensible and morally reflective court, as it works over time
to sharpen and refine its doctrine, will consider (along with many
other texts) the text of public opinion, which, both in its substance
and its fervor, may carry important truths. The essential force of
Bickel's metaphor is his realization that a judicial opinion is nothing
more than an argument for the proposition that an initiative is right
or wrong, and an argument can only slow someone down. It is at
best a plea for rational reconsideration: a brake, not a wall.
Judicial review is effective law, because when courts hand down
controversial decisions, even the political actors who criticize the de-
cisions most vigorously obey them on pain of being painted as disres-
19 The tough question is what the Senate should do if its members feel bound (under the
argument presented here) to ignore the nominee's "judicial philosophy," when they know full
well that the President has (illegitimately) taken that very factor into account. One possibility
is to ignore the illegitimate factor in any case, on the ground that the President's breach of duty
should not lead to the same breach by the Senate. If, however, the Senate cannot comfortably
countenance what the President has done, it is better to reject the nominee out of hand, citing
the President's illegitimate conduct, than to damage the judiciary further by adding another
layer of substantive review.
20 A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT III (1975).
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pectful not simply to the Court, but to the law on which their own
authority is founded. This obedience is another example of a deeply
shared commitment to a public value (here, the rule of law) that binds
political action despite, or perhaps because of, its lack of theoretical
sophistication. No doubt there are lines that bound permissible legal
discourse, bounds beyond which no rational Justice would go, but the
specification of those lines is a question of politics. The nature of the
system for the selection of nominees - indeed, the nature of the
people doing the selecting - serves to ensure that no one with views
truly beyond the bounds of politically acceptable discourse could ever
be considered seriously as a nominee. It is folly to pretend that an
electable presidential candidate would imagine proposing a Justice
whose ideal discourse would transgress those boundaries. 21
There is, in other words, no reason for the Senate to set itself the
task of keeping off the Court nominees whose views stray too far
beyond the discourse of the mainstream, for the senators are then
policing for criminals unlikely to appear. If a nominee's ideas fall
within the very broad range of judicial views that are not radical in
any nontrivial sense - and Robert Bork has as much right to that
middle ground as any other nominee in recent decades - the Senate
enacts a terrible threat to the independence of the judiciary if a
substantive review of the nominee's legal theories brings about a
rejection.
The dilemma, then, is this: how can the Senate carry out its
responsibility to give voice to the deepest values and aspirations of
the American people, while at the same time not compromising the
necessary independence of the Justices? The answer may be to un-
dertake what members of the Senate seem mysteriously reluctant to
do - to try to get a sense of the whole person, an impression par-
taking not only of the nominee's public legal arguments, but of her
entire moral universe.
The rhetoric of judging insists that judges should put aside their
personal beliefs when called upon to decide what the law requires.
In constitutional adjudication especially, however, no matter how
much judges strive to interpret without regard to their background
morality, they cannot hope for a complete separation of judgment
from judge. In this sense, constitutional interpretation is like the
interpretation of any other text. The words of the Constitution do
not, by themselves, determine very much, and all who must strive to
interpret and apply the text, no matter how great their intellectual
force or legal sophistication, must at some point make leaps of faith
not wholly explicable by reference to standard tools for interpreta-
21 See Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARv. L. REv. 781, 823-24 (x983).
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tion.22 There is in every interpretive task a moment when the inter-
preter's own experience and values become the most important data.
That moment cannot be spotted in advance, any more than the press-
ing issues of ten years hence can be predicted today. But it is certain
that the moment will come, and the Senate can help the nation to be
ready when it does.
The issue, finally, is not what sort of theory the nominee happens
to indulge, but what sort of person the nominee happens to be. There
are two senses in which this judgment ought to matter. First, the
nominee ought to be a person for whom moral choices occasion deep
and sustained reflection. Second, the nominee ought, in the judgment
of the Senate, to be an individual whose personal moral decisions
seem generally sound. In moments of crisis, we call upon the Court
for a statement of law and, more often than most theorists care to
admit, we receive instruction in practical morality instead. At such
times, what matters most is not what sort of legal philosophers sit on
the Court, but what sort of moral philosophers sit there. Even when
times are less difficult and the issues less divisive, the background
moral vision of the judge and the degree of her moral reflectiveness
nevertheless play significant parts in shaping her interpretive conclu-
sions. This background moral vision and the capacity for moral
reflection are perhaps the most important aspects of the judicial per-
sonality, and it is for these that the Senate, which enjoys the political
space to reflect on the fundamental values of the nation, ought to be
searching.
Thus the political task in the real world of real interpretive prob-
lems is to people the bench not with Justices holding the right con-
stitutional theories but with Justices possessing the right moral in-
stincts. In this sense, it is far less useful to know that a nominee has
ruled that private clubs violate no constitutional provisions when they
discriminate against nonwhites than to know whether the nominee
herself has belonged to a club with such policies, and for how long.
A legal theory leading to the conclusion that private clubs are not
regulated by the Constitution is a matter of debate, a matter on which
one may take instruction, a matter for a later change of mind. But
a lifelong habit of associating by choice with those who prefer not to
associate with people of the wrong color tells something vitally im-
portant about the character and instincts of a would-be constitutional
interpreter, something not easily disavowed by so simple an expedient
as, for example, resigning from the club.
Legal theories, like legal institutions, are ultimately no better than
those who take them in charge. Within the universe of acceptable
22 This insight is as old as interpretation. For a more detailed elucidation of my own views
on the point, see Carter, The Right Questions in the Creation of Constitutional Meaning, 66
B.U.L. REv. 71, 81-87 (ig86).
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legal discourse - a universe for which the system will screen quite
effectively without aid from the Senate - a morally upright proponent
of an unpopular or eccentric theory will likely turn out to be a better
Justice than one who propounds an acceptable theory but whose
personal morality is cynical or mendacious. But "better" is used here
in a special sense: the morally superior Justice will be better than the
one with the right philosophy in the sense that her instincts will be
morally sound, and those instincts, when brought to bear on concrete
cases, should be of salutary rather than destructive effect on the Court
and on the country.
The Senate would not, of course, be able to predict the particular
results that the morally upright Justice would reach in concrete cases,
and the reflective Senate would not try. There would be no campaign
promises. And yet, over the very long run, as new and unexpected
issues arise, there should evolve a healthy convergence between the
moral direction of the Justice and the fundamental moral vision of
the nation the Justice serves. The popular sense should come to be
one of a good, trusted, upstanding individual sitting on the bench, so
that even when the people dislike her work, they will obey her - not
simply because of her legal authority, but because she is someone held
in respect. This prospect might in turn reduce today's tension between
the ideal of judicial independence and the demand that the courts
support particular political programs. And in the worst of times,
when fresh and unexpected issues present grim moral choices, the
times when the courts might be most desperately needed, the morally
superior individual will almost certainly be the morally superior jurist.
There is, of course, a risk to an approach that seeks to evaluate
the personal moral judgment of the nominee: the wall between the
public and the private domains, a wall that is dear to liberal and
libertarian theory, might be breached. "Has this nominee violated
marital vows?" the senators might demand. "Has that one voted
Republican? Used marijuana? Had an abortion?" None of these
queries can be dismissed as entirely irrelevant, unless one wants to
suppose a theory of human motivation that rigorously separates the
moral premises for actions on the two sides of the wall. Relevance,
however, is not the same as propriety, and the question is who will
decide what lines of relevant inquiry are nevertheless inappropriate.
Perhaps the Senate is too risky a place to lodge the power of decision.
And yet, if members of the Senate who must reach a moral judgment
on the nominee are not to be trusted to draw a line between what
may legitimately be considered and what may not, then it is not easy
to see why they ought to be trusted with any other aspect of the
confirmation decision. For if there is indeed a line between the two,
its very location - like the location of the line that bounds rational
discourse - is a question not of abstract theory, but of politics.
Senators inclined to vote "No" because the nominee has had an abor-
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tion, or because she refuses to say whether she has or not, must make
their decisions in light of the practical political consequences. The
political consequences of rejecting a nominee because she has had an
abortion, in turn, say something important about the kind of moral
judgment that the American people are prepared to respect.
That perhaps is too idealized a notion of the relationship between
the American people and the Supreme Court. Perhaps results really
are all that matter. Presidents often act as though they value only
results, the interest groups that campaign for and against each nom-
ination seem bent entirely on prediction, and the Court itself is hardly
immune to the criticism that the result in many cases is all that drives
its analysis. But even if there is in the end less truth than aspiration
in the vision of an independent and reflective Supreme Court, the
Senate of the United States, designed to combine a degree of political
sensitivity with the distance necessary for reflection and deliberation,
should be the last institution of government to surrender the myth.
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